A dam in Syria was on a ‘no-strike’ listing. The US bombed it anyway.

Near the peak of the battle towards the Islamic State group in Syria, a sudden riot of explosions rocked the nation’s largest dam, a towering, 18-story construction on the Euphrates River that held again a 25-mile-long reservoir above a valley the place lots of of hundreds of individuals lived.
The Tabqa Dam was a strategic linchpin managed by the Islamic State group. The explosions March 26, 2017, knocked dam employees to the bottom. A fireplace unfold and essential tools failed. The circulation of the Euphrates River abruptly had no manner via, the reservoir started to rise and authorities used loudspeakers to warn folks downstream to flee.
The management room of the Tabqa Dam in Syria, June 20, 2018. (Ivor Prickett/The New York Times)
The Islamic State group, the Syrian authorities and Russia blamed the United States, however the dam was on the US navy’s “no-strike list” of protected civilian websites, and the commander of the US offensive on the time, then-Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, mentioned allegations of US involvement have been primarily based on “crazy reporting.”
In truth, members of a top-secret US particular operations unit referred to as Task Force 9 had struck the dam utilizing a few of the largest standard bombs within the US arsenal, together with a minimum of one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb, in accordance with two former senior officers. And they’d accomplished it regardless of a navy report warning to not bomb the dam, as a result of the harm might trigger a flood that may kill tens of hundreds of civilians.
The determination to strike the dam would usually have been made excessive up the chain of command. But the previous officers mentioned the duty power used a procedural shortcut reserved for emergencies, permitting it to launch the assault with out clearance.
The two former officers, who spoke on the situation that they not be named as a result of they weren’t approved to debate the strikes, mentioned some officers overseeing the air battle considered the duty power’s actions as reckless.

Even with cautious planning, hitting a dam with such giant bombs would probably have been seen by high leaders as unacceptably harmful, mentioned Scott F. Murray, a retired Air Force colonel.
“Using a 2,000-pound bomb against a restricted target like a dam is extremely difficult and should have never been done on the fly,” he mentioned. “Worst case, those munitions could have absolutely caused the dam to fail.”
After the strikes, dam employees came upon an ominous piece of fine fortune: Five flooring deep within the dam’s management tower, a US BLU-109 bunker buster lay on its facet, scorched however intact — a dud. If it had exploded, consultants say, the entire dam might need failed.
In response to questions from The New York Times, US Central Command, which oversaw the air battle in Syria, acknowledged dropping three 2,000-pound bombs however denied focusing on the dam or sidestepping procedures. A spokesperson mentioned that the bombs hit solely the towers connected to the dam, not the dam itself, and whereas high leaders had not been notified beforehand, restricted strikes on the towers had been preapproved by the command.
A employee within the turbine corridor a yr after the bombing of the Tabqa Dam in Syria, June 20, 2018. (Ivor Prickett/The New York Times)
“Analysis had confirmed that strikes on the towers attached to the dam were not considered likely to cause structural damage to the Tabqa Dam itself,” mentioned Capt. Bill Urban, the chief spokesperson for the command. Noting that the dam didn’t collapse, he added, “That analysis has proved accurate.”
But the 2 former officers, who have been instantly concerned within the air battle on the time, and Syrian witnesses interviewed by the Times, mentioned the scenario was much more dire than the US navy publicly mentioned.
Critical tools lay in ruins and the dam stopped functioning fully. The reservoir rapidly rose 50 ft and practically spilled over the dam, which engineers mentioned would have been catastrophic. The scenario grew so determined that enemies within the yearslong battle — the Islamic State group, the Syrian authorities, Syrian protection forces and the United States — referred to as an emergency cease-fire so civilian engineers might race to avert a catastrophe.
Engineers who labored on the dam, who didn’t need to be recognized as a result of they feared reprisal, mentioned it was solely via fast work that the dam and the folks residing downstream of it have been saved.
Damage the place a coalition missile penetrated 5 tales of the Tabqa Dam’s north tower in Syria, Dec. 15, 2008. (Azmat Khan/The New York Times)
“The destruction would have been unimaginable,” a former director on the dam mentioned.
The United States went into the battle towards the Islamic State group in 2014 with focusing on guidelines meant to guard civilians and spare crucial infrastructure.
But the Islamic State group sought to use these guidelines, utilizing civilian no-strike websites as weapons depots, command facilities and combating positions. That included the Tabqa Dam.
The job power’s resolution to this downside too typically was to put aside the principles meant to guard civilians, present and former navy personnel mentioned.
Soon, the duty power was justifying nearly all of its airstrikes utilizing emergency self-defense procedures meant to save lots of troops in life-threatening conditions, even when no troops have been at risk. That allowed it to rapidly hit targets — together with no-strike websites — that may have in any other case been off-limits.

Perhaps no single incident reveals the brazen use of self-defense guidelines and the doubtless devastating prices greater than the strike on the Tabqa Dam.
It is unclear what spurred the duty power assault March 26.
Dam employees mentioned they noticed no heavy combating or casualties that day earlier than the bombs hit.
What is obvious is that Task Force 9 operators referred to as in a self-defense strike, which meant they didn’t have to hunt permission from the chain of command.
A navy report obtained via a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit reveals the operators contacted a B-52 bomber and requested a right away airstrike on three targets. But the report makes no point out of enemy forces firing or heavy casualties. Instead, it says the operators requested the strikes for “terrain denial.”
A senior Defense Department official disputed that the duty power overstepped its authority by placing with out informing high leaders. The official mentioned the strikes have been carried out “within approved guidance” set by Townsend, the commander of the marketing campaign towards the Islamic State group.

First, the B-52 dropped bombs set to blow up within the air above the targets to keep away from damaging the constructions, the senior navy official mentioned. But when these did not dislodge the enemy fighters, the duty power referred to as for the bomber to drop three 2,000-pound bombs, together with a minimum of one bunker buster, this time set to blow up after they hit the concrete.
Two employees have been on the dam that day. One of them, {an electrical} engineer, recalled Islamic State fighters positioned within the northern tower as common that day, however no combating underway after they went into the dam to work on the cooling system.
Hours later, a sequence of booms knocked them to the ground. The room stuffed with smoke. The engineer discovered his manner out via a usually locked door that had been blown open. He froze when he noticed the wings of a US B-52.
The dominoes of a possible catastrophe have been now in movement. Damage to the management room precipitated water pumps to grab. Flooding then short-circuited electrical tools. With no energy to run essential equipment, water couldn’t move via the dam. There was a crane that would elevate the emergency floodgate, but it surely, too, had been broken by combating.
The engineer hid inside till he noticed the B-52 fly away after which discovered a motorbike. He sped to the home the place the dam supervisor lived and defined what had occurred.

Engineers in Islamic State territory referred to as their former colleagues within the Syrian authorities, who then contacted allies within the Russian navy for assist.
A couple of hours after the strike, a particular desk cellphone reserved for directed communications between the United States and Russia began ringing in an operations middle in Qatar. When a coalition officer picked up, a Russian officer warned that U.S. airstrikes had precipitated severe harm to the dam and there was no time to waste, in accordance with a coalition official.
Less than 24 hours after the strikes, US-backed forces, Russian and Syrian officers and the Islamic State group coordinated a pause in hostilities. A group of 16 employees — some from the Islamic State group, some from the Syrian authorities, some from U.S. allies — drove to the location, in accordance with the engineer, who was with the group.
They succeeded in repairing the crane, which ultimately allowed the floodgates to open, saving the dam.

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces dismissed stories of great harm as propaganda. A spokesperson mentioned the coalition had struck the dam with solely “light weapons, so as not to cause damage.”
A short while later, Townsend denied the dam was a goal and mentioned, “When strikes occur on military targets, at or near the dam, we use noncratering munitions to avoid unnecessary damage to the facility.”
No disciplinary motion was taken towards the duty power, the senior officers mentioned. The secret unit continued to strike targets utilizing the identical kinds of self-defense justifications it had used on the dam.
This article initially appeared in The New York Times.